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Monitoring by Delegates or by Peers?  








This paper analyzes the conditions under which joint liability loans to encourage peer-monitoring 
would be offered and chosen ahead of monitored individual liability alternatives on a competitive 
loan market when production and monitoring activities are subject to moral hazard.  In contrast to 
other analyses, the case for joint liability loans does not rest on an assumed monitoring or 
information advantage by borrowers but instead relies on a incentive diversification effect that 
cannot be replicated by outside intermediaries. Joint liability clauses are chosen to implement a 
preferred Nash equilibrium in a multi-agent, multi-tasking game, where borrowers must be given 
incentives to be diligent as financed entrepreneurs and as monitors of others. Potential side 
contracting or collusion amongst borrowers is shown to only harm credit access, even when 
borrowers enjoy a monitoring advantage relative to outsiders. 
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Joint liability loan clauses such as those employed by the non-proﬁtG r a m e e nB a n ko f
Bangladesh or the commercial Banco Solidario of Bolivia require that each member
of a small circle of borrowers be liable for the loans of other members of the group
should they become unable or unwilling to repay. The group loan methodology
has been widely imitated and adopted and is celebrated as a contractual innovation
that appears to achieve the apparent miracle of enabling previously marginalized
borrowers to lift themselves up by their own bootstraps by creating ‘social collateral’
to replace the missing physical loan collateral that excluded them from access to more
traditional forms of ﬁnance. Economists have taken notice, and by now a number
of papers have proposed theoretical explanations for how joint liability clauses might
work to create incentives for borrowers to peer-select, peer-monitor, or peer-sanction
in ways that outside lenders might ﬁnd diﬃcult or costly to imitate in a variety of
asymmetric information contexts.1
A few recent papers have, however, raised important questions about the pur-
ported optimality of joint liability loans in diﬀe r e n tc o n t e x t so rh a v ec h a l l e n g e dt h e
empirical validity of some of the assumptions upon which earlier arguments were
premised. One obvious criticism is that several analyses of group loans have simply
assumed that borrowers enjoy an information or enforcement advantage relative to
outsiders. While such an information advantage may well be important in practice,
joint liability loans cease to be quite as surprising or revolutionary once it has been
made clear that ‘closeness’ amongst borrowers has been assumed rather than derived.2
1The case for group loans in the context of ex-ante moral hazard problems has been argued under
diﬀerent assumptions by Stiglitz (1990), Conning (1996), Madajewicz (1997), Armendariz de Aghion
(1999) and Laﬀont and Rey (2000). The case for group loans to ameliorate the costs of ex-post
moral hazard has been explored by Besley and Coate (1991), Bond (1998), Diagne (1998), Che
(1999) and others. The adverse selection case has been explored by Ghatak (1999, 2000), Sadoulet
(1998), van Tassel (1999), Wydick (1999), Armendariz de Aghion and Gollier (2000) and N’Guessan
and Laﬀont (2000). Literature surveys include Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Morduch (1999).
2This explanation is the main interpretation found in recent literature surveys by Morduch (1999)
and Ghatak and Guinnane (1999). Models where closeness amongst borrowers is derived rather than
assumed include Conning (1996), Madajewicz (1997), Bond (1998), and Armendariz de Aghion and
1A related line of criticism is that even if borrowers are better informed than outsiders,
there may be ways other than joint liability contracts to get borrowers to truthfully
reveal the information they hold about each other (Rai and Sjostrom, 2000).
Microﬁnance practitioners are themselves in no way in agreement about the rela-
tive merits of group loans. Critics contend that the purported beneﬁts of group loans
have been exaggerated and that the methodology is often overly rigid and poorly
adapted to borrowers’ needs. They argue instead for simpler individual liability
loans monitored by locally recruited loan oﬃcers, which they claim achieve results
that are every bit as good or better than group loans.3 Even microlenders who
have become world famous for their group loan methodology such as Grameen of
Bangladesh do in fact also rely heavily upon highly motivated and locally recruited
loan staﬀ oﬃcers as monitors and organizers (Fuglesgang et al., 1993). This raises
the important question of whether such delegated monitors might not be just as good
at monitoring, and perhaps better at enforcing, loans than peer-monitors,4 in which
case joint liability clauses may be superﬂous or may be serving other purposes.
If joint liability loans in fact work by harnessing information that outsiders do not
have, could it not instead be optimal to just hire one borrower, or another informed
local, to act as a delegated monitor on behalf of a less informed outsider? Diamond
(1984) has argued that when monitoring is itself costly and subject to moral hazard,
there are advantages to concentrating monitoring activities in the hands of a single
specialized monitor because the cost of providing incentives to the delegate are lower
the more diversiﬁed are the returns in his portfolio of monitored projects. Since a
specialized microﬁnance loan oﬃcer can often monitor as many as several hundred
borrowers at once, diversiﬁcation opportunities would seem to be good. Most joint
liability loans in contrast typically involve two to ﬁve people, and rarely more than
twenty. Peer-monitoring also seems to be more prone to free-rider problems in mon-
Gollier (2000).
3Morduch (2000) and Conning (1999) summarize some of the main policy disagreements in the
ﬁeld. One camp, the so called ‘institutionists’ tends to favor individual liability loans and ﬁnancially
sustainabile lending, while ‘welfarists,’ are more likely to support group loans and targeted outreach
over ﬁnancial sustainability.
4Diagne (2000) and Wydick (2000) report on survey evidence from Malawi and Guatemala that
suggests that group borrowers may be quite reluctant to actively pressure delinquent group members.
To paraphrase a commonly heard expression: ‘the problem with co-signing for (or lending to) a friend
is that not only may you lose your money, you may also lose a friend.’
2itoring activities, particularly as group size increases, an issue that is not faced by a
single specialized delegated monitor.
The purpose of this paper is to present a model that helps to answer the question
of when joint liability loans will be optimal in the moral hazard context. When
monitoring is costless, joint liability loans in fact oﬀer no advantage over individual
liability loans, unless borrowers are better informed than outsiders. However, when
monitoring is a costly and imperfect activity (as it almost always surely is) joint
liability loans can provide an advantage over individual liability loans even when
group peer-monitors have the same or even a less eﬀective monitoring technology
than outside lenders or their delegated monitors.
Individual liability loans with costly delegated monitoring are modeled as in Holm-
strom and Tirole (1997). Optimal joint liability loan contracts are modeled as a
multi-task, principal-multiagent extension to this model, in which a lender engages
each member of a group in two diﬀerent capacities: as a borrower choosing actions on
a lender-ﬁnanced production project, and as a monitor of the other borrowers actions.
Both monitoring and production activities are assumed to be costly and subject to
moral hazard. Borrowers within a group are assumed to act non-cooperatively, but
the contract must also guard against the possibility of collusion. Working within this
setup, I will show that in a competitive loan market with heterogenous borrowers,
some borrowers are oﬀered and will choose joint liability loans, while other borrowers
may prefer individual liability contracts.
‘Monitoring’ is interpreted as any activity that might directly aﬀect a borrower’s
scope for moral hazard in the use of borrowed funds during the realization of the
project. Monitoring need not involve direct observation of the borrower’s actions.
For example, a lender may choose to visit a borrower regularly, or to provide loans
i n - k i n dr a t h e rt h a na sc a s hi no r d e rt oi n c r e a s et h eb o r r o w e r ’ sc o s to fd i v e r t i n gf u n d s
toward consumption or other projects that would harm the value of the ﬁnanced
activity.
T h eg a i nt oe m p l o y i n gg r o u pl o a n sr e l i e so na ni n c e n t i v ed i v e r s i ﬁcation eﬀect that
cannot be reproduced under alternative individual liability using direct monitoring or
delegated monitoring by outsiders. The reason is that joint liability places borrowers
into a multi-task setting in which borrowers can be simultaneously rewarded for
diligence in both production and monitoring, while incentives for each activity would
3have to be provided separately under individual liability contracts. This will be
t h ec a s ee v e ni ft h ep l a y i n gﬁeld is completely leveled by giving delegated monitors
the same or even slightly better monitoring technology than borrowers, and even if
delegated monitors are made to simultaneously oversee a portfolio of borrowers to
exploit incentive diversiﬁcation opportunities, as in Diamond (1984).
The model also helps to clarify the roles that side contracting or collusion play in
group loan design. The assumption of costless monitoring and full-side contracting
that Stiglitz (1990) used to explain group loans, and that Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1990), Itoh (1993), and Arnott and Stiglitz (1991) have employed in slightly diﬀerent
contexts, does not adequately describe the empirical observations of microﬁnance5
Group participation is costly, and groups often ﬁght and fall apart due to conﬂicts
and opportunistic behavior. To capture this, in the present analysis borrowers can
only monitor at a cost, they cannot observe each other’s actions perfectly, and they
choose their monitoring and production actions in a non-cooperative manner.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes and extends
a benchmark individual liability monitored lending model under conditions of free
entry and competition in the lending market. The model is shown to lead to three
possibly optimal intermediary structures: collateralized bank loans with no monitor-
ing, collateralized loans with a monitoring intermediary lender, and monitored loans
from specialized moneylenders. Section 3 then analyzes group-loans, contrasting their
properties to the lending arrangements of the previous section to show where each
type of intermediary structure will be optimal. The latter part of the section dis-
cusses the role of collusion. Section 4 discusses further interpretations, extensions
and limitations to the model, and section 5 concludes.
5Indeed one could argue that the deﬁning characteristic of microﬁnance is that it requires costly
monitoring to substitute for missing collateral. In their study of Grameen bank, Khanker and Pitt
(1995) succinctly capture the issues when they state: “participation is costly, as group formation,
training, and other group activities are time consuming and involve opportunity costs of time spent
in group based activities ... [I]f there were not monitoring of the use of borrowed funds and group
responsibility and decision making in the lending program, individuals would likely want to borrow
much more than they actually do.”
42T h e M o d e l
Consider a population of entrepreneurs who are identical in all respects except for
their initial level of collateral assets A. Each entrepreneur has access to a simple
production project that requires a non-recoverable lump sum investment I.E n t r e -
preneurs do not have I and so they turn to the credit market. If the investment is
made, the project generates stochastic but veriﬁable project returns of either xs if
the project is successful or xf if it fails. Borrowing will be subject to moral hazard,
however, because a borrower is assumed to be able to aﬀect the probability of project
success or failure through his actions, and this may in turn aﬀect the lender’s expected
repayment. For example, a farmer who borrows $100 to apply pesticide to a crop
might decide to divert $50 to another purpose and apply only half the recommended
dosage, thereby increasing the probability that the crop is destroyed and that the
loan cannot be repaid.
To ﬁx ideas, suppose that when the entrepreneur diligently purchases inputs and
applies labor eﬀort as promised under a loan contract, the project succeeds with
probability π and fails with probability (1−π). When the borrower instead chooses
to be non-diligent, say by diverting borrowed funds or eﬀort away from the ﬁnanced
activity and toward other consumption or production activities, the probability of
project success falls to π < π. Non-diligence generates private beneﬁts B(c) to the
borrower which the lender cannot verify or seize. The value of the private beneﬁts
that the borrower may potentially capture are assumed, however, to be inﬂuenced by
the level of ‘monitoring’ expenditure c that a lender or her delegate spends monitoring
or otherwise trying to limit the size of those potential private beneﬁts. Lenders may,
for example, attempt to limit the borrower’s scope for diverting cash from a fertilizer
loan by providing the loan in kind, or by making frequent and unexpected visits to
monitor the farmer’s ﬁelds. Such activities, which are evidently costly for the lender
to undertake, lower the net private beneﬁts the borrower can capture through being
non-diligent. It is reasonable to assume that the more that is spent on monitoring
and control activities, the lower are the potential private beneﬁts the borrower can
expect from non-diligence, but that (eventually at least) there are diminishing returns
to monitoring. Thus we assume that Bc < 0 and Bcc > 0.6
6Other monitoring technologies could be accomodated without altering the model’s main
5To focus attention on the cost of moral hazard, assume that the project is prof-
itable under diligence but not proﬁtable under non-diligence, even at zero monitoring:
E(xi|π) − γI ≥ 0 >E (xi|π) − γI + B(0)
where E(x|π)=πxs +( 1− π)xf is the expected value of the project returns and γ
is the market rate of return (one plus the interest rate) that the lender could have
earned had I been left in a bank deposit. From the above expression it is evident
that a producer who used his own investment resources I would never choose to be
non-diligent.
2.1 Individual Liability Loan Contracts
Building on a version of the model considered by Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), this
section examines the design of simple individual liability loans to borrowers with
diﬀerent initial levels of collateral to oﬀer. These loans may or may not involve
monitoring. We ﬁrst analyze the simplest case of a lender who directly monitors
borrowers herself, and then extend the analysis to lenders or investors who lend via
other monitoring intermediary lenders or through hired loan staﬀ. These scenarios
give us benchmarks against which we can later compare joint liability lending.
Most investors rely on delegated monitors in their own lending activities. For
example, bank owners hire loan oﬃcers. Another typical situation is that banks
choose to lend money Iu to ﬁrms or other ﬁnancial intermediaries who in turn on-
lend these funds plus some of their own funds Im to a ﬁnal set of borrowers. In this
case the bank is helping to ﬁnance these borrowers via the intermediary. Formally, all
that really distinguishes the loan oﬃcer from the intermediary lender is the degree of
liability that the delegated monitor must assume in the event that the ﬁnal borrowers’
project fails. The loan oﬃcer’s liability for loan failures will typically be limited by
law, while an intermediary lender risks losing up to the amount of funds Im she has
predictions. For example, an initial indivisibility (e.g. monitoring requires a ﬁxed monitor-
ing setup cost) would imply that monitoring expenses only have eﬀects above some mini-
mum threshold. One might also at ﬁrst assume increasing or constant returns to monitoring
(Bcc ≤ 0) before diminishing returns set in (Bcc > 0).
6placed at risk in the borrower’s project. In either case the outside investor presumably
prefers to work via a delegated monitor or intermediary rather than lend directly to
the ﬁnal borrower because the intermediary has a better monitoring technology.
Suppose entrepreneurs’ project returns are independent from one another. The
loan market is assumed to be competitive with free entry into both lending and
intermediation activities. Consider ﬁrst the case of a delegated monitor who lends
Im of her own capital and attempts to leverage the remainder Iu = I − Im from an
uninformed outside investor. The contract design problem involves deciding on how
to divide available project outcomes xi between repayments to an uninformed lender
Ri, payments to a delegated monitor wi,and returns to the borrower si = xi−Ri−wi.7
T h es e q u e n c eo fa c t i o n si sa sf o l l o w s .Ac o n t r a c ti sp r o p o s e dt h a tm a yo rm a yn o t
involve a delegated monitor. If a monitor is to be involved, then the monitor chooses
her own preferred monitoring strategy which involves spending resources c.A w a r eo f
this monitoring activity, the borrower then chooses his unobserved diligence level π.
Finally, claims to the observed project outcome are divided according to the terms
of the agreed contract. Assuming a competitive lending market with free entry into
both the uninformed and monitored lending activities, the optimal contract {si,w i}






E(wi|π) − c ≥ γI
m (2)
E(si|π) ≥ E(si|π)+B(c) (3)
E(wi|π) − c ≥ E(wi|π) (4)
si ≥− Ai =1 ,2 (5)
I
m + I
u = I, Ri = xi − wi − si
where (1) is the investor’s participation constraint or break-even constraint, (2) is
7The case of a bank loan oﬃcer will later be shown to just involve imposing an additional limited
liability constraint equivalent to Im =0and wf =0 .
7the delegated monitor’s break-even condtion, (3) is the borrower’s incentive compat-
ibility constraint, (4) is the monitor’s incentive compatibility constraint, and (5) are
the borrower’s limited liability constraints. The uninformed lender’s break-even con-
straint requires that this lender earn at least as much from expected repayments as
she could earn by leaving the same funds Iu in a bank deposit. The intermediary’s
participation constraint (2) states that the expected value of repayments wi to an
intermediary who lends Im of her own funds and monitors at optimal intensity c
must at least equal what the intermediary could have earned from the bank net of
the monitoring expense.
The borrower’s limited liability constraint (5) expresses the fact that total repay-
ments from the borrower to the lender(s) following any given project outcome xi may
not exceed the value of that project outcome plus the borrower’s pledged collateral
assets A,o rRi +wi ≤ xi +A. Inequality (5) is obtained by re-arranging noting that
Ri + wi = xi − si.
The borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint can be rearranged to yield the
more convenient expression:
ss − sf ≥
B(c)
∆π
where ∆π =( π −π). This reveals that an optimal contract will require the borrower
to earn more from successful outcomes than from failures so as to provide an incentive
to raise the probability of success via diligence.
If the contract is to involve any monitoring, the intermediary will also face an
incentive constraint because her monitoring actions are not observed by the outsider
lender. Since monitoring lowers the borrower’s private beneﬁt B(c) at expense c which
in turn raises the borrower’s incentive to raise the probability of the project being a
success, the contract should reward the intermediary for the borrower’s successes and
punish him for failures. This can be seen clearly when the intermediary’s incentive
compatibility constraint (4) is rewritten as ws − wf ≥ c
∆π.
The assumption of free entry into the monitoring activity assures that the moni-
tor’s participation constraint (2) must be binding and that wf−γIm ≤ 0.8 As monitors
8This follows because (2) implicitly assumes that the monitor’s outside reservation income is zero.
If wf − γIm > 0 the incentive constraint (4) would then require ws − γIm ≥ wf − γIm + c
∆π > 0
and the monitor would be earning a strictly positive enforcement rent E(w|π) − γIm − c>0.B u t
then the borrower would switch to another monitored arrangement where the monitor’s expected
8a r er i s kn e u t r a l ,t h e r ea r ei nf a c ta ni n ﬁnite number of {wf,w s} combinations that
would keep the monitor at his reservation utility and at the same time satisfy the
incentive constraint. Without loss of generality we can focus on contracts in which
the monitor’s incentive constraint also binds. This then implies that if monitoring
takes place, then wf =0and ws = c
∆π,w i t hc still to be determined. Note that since
then E(wi|π)=π c







where the last inequality holds strictly whenever π > π > 0 and c>0. Hence when
c>0 the contract calls for the monitor to acquire a strictly positive stake in the
borrower’s project by lending Im > 0 out of her own equity, to leverage a remaining
Iu = I − Im from an uninformed outside lender.
Can a borrower with assets A credibly commit to repayments that are suﬃcient to
cover the lender’s opportunity cost of funds and monitoring costs? From the limited
liability constraint it is evident that the most that a borrower can commit to pay in the
failure state is the full value of output xf plus any pledged collateral resources A. Thus
Rf +wf = xf +A,o rsf = −A. A large payment following success Rs +ws = xs −ss
in turn requires ss to be as small as possible, but by limited liability the lowest sf
can be is sf = −A, and by the incentive constraint, ss must be no smaller than
ss = sf +B(c)/∆π = −A+B(c)/∆π. If both the incentive compatibility and limited
liability constraints are to be met, the borrower must therefore earn a minimum rent
or a minimum expected return E(si|π)=−A + π
B(c)
∆π . Substituting this minimum
expected return and E(wi|π) into the investor’s break-even condition yields:

















+ A − π
c
∆π




E(xi|π) − γI ≥ π
B(c)
∆π
− A + c (10)
rent is smaller. Competition to provide monitoring services means this rent must be driven to zero,
or wf − γIm ≤ 0.
9If the lender’s break even condition is not satisﬁed, no loan will be available to this
type of borrower. The expression above states that lending will take place so long
as net project returns E(xi|π) − γI exceed the borrower’s rent plus the monitoring
costs required for a borrower with collateral assets A. This immediately suggests an
ineﬃc i e n c y ,a st h e r ea r ep o s i t i v en e tp r e s e n tv a l u ep r o j e c t st h a tw i l ln o tb ef u n d e d .
All that remains is to ﬁnd the contract within this feasible set that is most pre-
ferred by the borrower. In this competitive lending market, the monitor and the
uninformed lender’s participation constraints both bind and the borrower’s expected
return is simply
E(si|π)=E(xi|π) − γI − c
from which it is obvious that the borrower is best oﬀ using as little monitored lending
as possible. How far monitoring can be lowered without disrupting incentives depends
on the borrower’s collateral holdings. A convenient way to focus on the problem is to
search for the locus of monitoring c and collateral A combinations at which lenders
just break even and are willing to participate. Rearranging the binding uninformed
lender’s participation constraint (10), we can solve for A(c)or the minimum level of




− E(x|π)+γI + c (11)
Whether monitoring lowers the minimum collateral requirement on a loan depends
on the nature of the monitoring technology. There are two eﬀects. On the one hand,
monitoring lowers the borrower’s private beneﬁts from non-diligence. On the margin
this relaxes the borrower’s incentive compatibility constraint by π
Bc(c)
∆π and hence the
rent that must be left with the borrower, and this lowers the collateral requirement.
On the other hand, monitoring is a costly activity which must be paid, so every extra
dollar’s worth of monitoring eats away at the project surplus from which repayments
can be made. This second eﬀect raises the collateral requirement. Assume that the
ﬁrst dollar spent on monitoring has a net eﬀect of lowering the collateral hurdle, or
π
Bc(0)
∆π > −1, so monitoring is at ﬁrst useful in reducing the collateral requirement.
The assumption of diminishing returns to monitoring (Bcc > 0) guarantees, however,
that there eventually will be some monitoring intensity c beyond which no further
10monitoring is worthwhile. The cutoﬀ c is deﬁned by the condition π
Bc(c)
∆π = −1.
Beyond c the marginal beneﬁt of an extra dollar of monitoring exceeds its marginal
cost and therefore is not worthwhile. Figure 1 illustrates how the minimum collateral
requirement might fall over the range (0,c) and rise thereafter.
Figure 1 about here
Because monitoring eats up real resources, monitored lending is always more ex-
pensive than uninformed lending. It follows that only borrowers with assets below
A(0) who cannot gain access to direct bank loans turn to this form of ﬁnance and
then choose loans that involve only as much monitoring as is minimally required to
lower the collateral requirement to their available collateral asset level A. The op-
timal monitoring level is therefore given implicitly by A = A(c),o re q u i v a l e n t l yb y
c(A)=A
−1(A), where A is the borrower’s initial collateral wealth.
Since the borrower makes expected payments of γI +c(A) on I dollars borrowed,
the implicit interest rate is γ+
c(A)
I which is non-increasing in the borrower’s collateral
A. Poorer borrowers therefore pay higher implicit interest rates and also have a larger
proportion of monitored lending Im in their total ﬁnance package. This last point
can be seen by the fact that γIm = π
c(A)
∆π − c(A) rises with c(A) and therefore falls
with A.
As we move through borrowers with less and less initial collateral wealth, it is
possible that monitoring intensity will rise until it has reached a point b c deﬁned by
γIm = π b c
∆π − b c = γI. At this point so much monitoring is needed that the interme-
diary’s required liability Im equals the full lump sum investment I: hence no outside
leverage is possible. Borrowers with less than A(b c) in collateral therefore can obtain
loan size I only from a lender who lends entirely out of her own equity. Several studies
of rural credit markets have characterized informal moneylenders in precisely these
terms: moneylenders lend primarily out of own equity, they monitor their borrowers
very heavily, and they charge high interest rates (Aleem, 1994; Bell, 1994). Moni-
toring intensity eventually reaches level c, beyond which further monitoring becomes
simply unproﬁtable. This deﬁnes an absolute minimum collateral requirement A(c),
below which borrowers will be excluded entirely from the loan market.9
9I’ve assumed that the borrower’s own participation constraint does not bind before
112.2 Delegation costs
T h u sf a rw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tad e l e g a t e dm o n i t o rc o u l da l w a y sb em a d es u ﬃciently
liable for a borrower’s project failure by the requirement that she lend Im out of her
own equity, and competition amongst intermediaries drove the monitor’s proﬁts to
zero. From the borrower’s standpoint the loan terms would have been exactly the
same had we simply had the bank monitor the borrower directly with the same
monitoring technology B(c) rather than via a delegate. It is not always reasonable to
assume that a bank can ﬁnd delegated monitors with enough intermediary capital to
service all markets. In many poor communities the agents most likely to have access
to the best monitoring technology may be poor themselves. Commercial banks cannot
ask their hired loan staﬀ to assume liability for their borrowers’ project failures.
This case can be modeled by assuming that γIm =0 and imposing a limited
liability constraint wf ≥ 0 for the delegate . Competition in monitoring activities then
assures that this constraint will bind and that any optimal contract will set ws = c
∆π .
The monitor must now also earn a rent or delegation cost E(wi|π)−c = π c
∆π −c>0,
for just the same reason that the collateral-poor borrower earns a rent. Substituting
this delegation cost into the derivations above yields a new expression describing the









It is easy to see that the relationship between this expression and the earlier expression
(11) for A(c) is A
d(c)=A(c) − c + π c
∆π = A(c)+γIm. Hence A
d(c) >A (c) at every
level of c, which in turn implies that loans monitored by delegated monitors such
as hired staﬀ are in general more expensive than loans where the delegate can be
made liable. As discussed above, an insight from Diamond (1984) suggests that these
delegation costs might be pushed down by placing each loan oﬃcer in charge of a
portfolio of monitored borrowers with diversiﬁed project returns. If this argument is
pushed to its limit, we are back to A(c).
monitoring level c is reached. If the farmer’s has a reservation utility given by K,t h e n
his binding participation constraint E(si|π)=E(xi|π) − γI − c = K deﬁnes a cutoﬀ level
ck = E(xi|π) − γI − K. I assume therefore that c ≤ ck.
123 Joint Liability Loans
Group lending arrangements delegate the task of monitoring to the borrowers them-
selves rather than to an outside monitor. One obvious potential advantage of this
approach that has been frequently mentioned in the literature is that borrowers may
be more eﬀective monitors because they belong to the same social networks and may
already interact in other economic exchange relationships. But joint liability loans
may oﬀer advantages that go beyond this eﬀect.
I nap e e r - m o n i t o r e dl o a ne a c hm e m b e ro ft h eg r o u pm u s tb eg i v e ni n c e n t i v e st o
act both as a borrower choosing diligence π on his ﬁnanced production project and
as a delegated monitor choosing the optimum intensity c at which to monitor and/or
otherwise attempt to control the actions of other members in the group. Since neither
activity is observable to an outside lender, the structure of the problem is that of a
multi-task principal-multi-agent problem.
Consider the joint liability contract between a single uninformed lender and a
symmetric two-member group. Symmetry allows us to economize on notation and
describe the contract terms primarily from the perspective of borrower one, except
w h e r ea m b i g u i t ym i g h ta r i s e .F o re x a m p l e ,xn
i denotes project outcome i for borrower
n.L e t sij denote the contractual return to borrower one following an outcome x1
i
on his own project and an outcome x2
j on borrower two’s project. Because there are
four possible joint outcomes, the joint-liability reward schedule for the borrower is
(sss,s sf,s fs,s ff). Assume that the two borrowers’ project returns are statistically
independent, so the joint probability of observing output pair (x1
i,x 2





j. While this assumption is restrictive, it helps to distinguish
clearly the mechanism analyzed here from other explanations for why repayment rules
m i g h tb em a d et ob ei n t e r d e p e n d e n ta ss u g g e s t e df o r ,e x a m p l e ,b yt h el i t e r a t u r eo n
relative performance evaluation (Holmstrom, 1979; Mookherjee, 1984).
Just as the outside intermediary monitor could not, group members cannot ob-
serve each other’s diligence level in production directly. Nor need we assume that
monitoring intensities are directly observed. Borrowers only infer what the other
borrower’s production and monitoring actions are likely to be from the known terms
of the contract, and they choose their own actions accordingly.
In order to isolate more starkly the mechanism at work it will be useful to assume
13that the monitoring technology employed by the borrowers cum monitors is exactly
the same as the one used by the outside delegated monitor in the last section. A
borrowers can thus lower the private rewards B(c) that the other borrower stands
to obtain from non-diligence by dedicating time and resources c to monitoring. One
might well imagine, especially in the context of small tight-knit communities that
peer-monitoring in fact operates through somewhat diﬀerent channels than monitor-
ing by an outsider. For example, a borrower might simply be less likely to divert
funds to private purposes because he would feel more guilty or be more likely to face
costly social retaliation for cheating on a friend or community member than he would
for cheating on a bank clerk or hired intermediary to whom he owes no particular
allegiance. This would especially be the case when that friend or community member
has demonstrated a willingness to bear liability for the borrower’s failures and has
spent time and energy on the group project.10 On the other hand, collusion also
seems more likely to occur amongst borrowers.
The contracting problem can be thought of as a mechanism design problem. The
terms of the contract sij will determine the payoﬀ structure of a game in monitoring
intensities and production action choices played by two borrowers. Figures 2 and 3
depict the game played between two borrowers joined together by contract {sij}.A ta
ﬁrst game stage borrowers play a non-cooperative game in monitoring intensities. Any
given monitoring intensity pair (c1,c 2) chosen at the ﬁrst stage then determines the
payoﬀ structure ζ(c1,c 2) of a subgame in action choices at the second stage. We search
for a pure strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) implementation. The
desired outcome is that each borrower choose an equilibrium monitoring intensity c
at a ﬁrst game stage which then helps implement diligence choice π as the equilibrium
outcome in a second stage game in production actions. As monitoring is an expensive
activity, an optimal contract aims to keep the value of c as low as is consistent with
sustained incentives.
Figures 2 and 3 about here
10Pitt and Khandler (1995) describe the near-religious fervor that is at times generated
and expected from group members in the Grameen Bank. Social presure is placed on
members to attend meetings at which they make solemn oaths to one another and to the
principles of the bank. This type of actions seems clearly aimed at making group members
internalize feelings of guilt or remorse for taking actions that harm the group while feeling
pride or joy for actions that contribute.
14For a given contract sij the expected monetary return to borrower One from his
production activity is denoted E(sij|π1,π2).T h eﬁnal payoﬀ to each borrower must,
however, also subtract out the costs of monitoring and add in any private beneﬁts
that might have been captured. A joint liability structure will require that sss ≥ ssf
and sfs ≥ sff with at least one strict inequality. In other words, one borrower’s
return is increasing in the other borrower’s measured performance.11
The following proposition characterizes the structure of incentive compatible group
loan contracts, while the discussion below establishes when group loans will be of-
















If Bc(0) < − 1
π, then a symmetric joint liability loan contract sij will be available to
borrowers with collateral assets A ∈ (A
g(0),A
g(cg)) where cg is deﬁnedby A
g(cg)=
A
g(cg). The group contract induces monitoring intensity c(A) implicitly deﬁned by
A = A
g(c). The optimal contract sij hasthe following simple structure sss = Z(c) −
A
g(c),s sf = sfs = sff = −A
g(c),w h e r eA
g(c) is deﬁned as above and Z(c)=
B(c)
π∆π.
An overall explanation and economic intuition for interpreting the result follows
below, but details of the proof are relegated to the appendix. The following functions
which summarize payoﬀs to borrower one in each of the four cells of subgame ζ(c1,c 2)
will be useful (see ﬁgure 5 and discussion in the appendix):
DD(c1,c 2):E(sij|π,π) − c1
ND(c1,c 2):E(sij|π,π) − c1 + B(c2)
DN(c1,c 2):E(sij|π,π) − c1
NN(c1,c 2):E(sij|π,π) − c1 + B(c2)
(15)
11This is in contrast to a relative performance evaluation contract which requires one borrower’s
reward to be decreasing in the other borrower’s measured performance.
15For example ND(c1,c 2)=E(sij|π,π) − c1 + B(c2) is the ﬁnal payoﬀ to borrower 1
when he is non-diligent (chooses π)a n dm o n i t o r st h eo t h e rb o r r o w e ra ti n t e n s i t yc1
while borrower 2 chooses diligence and monitors borrower 1 at intensity c2.
If a contract is to implement the diligence strategy proﬁle (π,π) as a Nash equi-
librium in subgame ζ(c,c) then the following incentive compatibility constraint must
be met for borrower 1 (and symmetrically for borrower 2):
DD(c,c) ≥ ND(c,c) (16)
Writing out this inequality, substituting the proposed solution structure from Propo-
sition 1, and rearranging yields:
ππZ(c) − A





w h e r ea sb e f o r e∆π =( π −π). This expression can be substituted into the investor’s
binding participation constraint for each borrower12
E(Rij|π,π)=E(x|π) − E(sij|π,π)=γI
As before, this expression allows us to solve for the minimum collateral requirement







This is (13) in the Proposition.
Another condition that the contract must meet is that the borrowers not have the
incentive to accept the contract but then collude to choose any action pair other than
the equilibrium outcome we wish to implement. As is explained in the appendix,
it will be enough to require that the borrowers prefer the payoﬀs they obtain from
choosing diligence and optimal monitoring intensity c to what they could obtain by
12The expression exploits symmetry to express the investor’s constraint only in
terms of farmer One’s expected project outcome and return.
16choosing not to monitor each other and choosing non-diligence:
DD(c,c) ≥ NN(0,0)
E(sij|π,π) − c ≥ E(sij|π,π)+B(0˙ ) (17)
Writing this inequality out in full yields:
ππsss + π(1 − π)ssf +( 1− π)πsfs+( 1− π)2sff − c ≥
ππsss + π(1 − π)ssf +( 1− π)πsfs+( 1− π)2sff + B(0)
(18)
A little thought reveals that this constraint can be met at minimum collateral ex-
pense by using a ‘live or die’ contract structure such that the proposed contract places
as much of the borrower’s reward on sss while setting the other sij as low as possible
(which by the limited liability means full payment out of collateral).13 This is optimal
because the joint outcome xss in general provides the sharpest possible signal that
the borrower-cum-monitor has chosen the desired π and c and the theory of optimal
contract design dictates that maximum reward be placed on the most informative
signals (Holmstrom, 1979).14 The diversiﬁcation eﬀect described in Stiglitz’ (1990)
and Laﬀont and Rey (2000) relies essentially on this result. The diﬀerence here is that
the diversiﬁcation is shown to operate at the level of each individual borrower and to
involve diversiﬁcation between the production and the costly monitoring activity.
Substituting a contract of the proposed shape into expression (17) above yields:
ππZ(c) − A





which, after substitution into the investor’s participation constraint requires that the
13As explained by Innes (1990), live-or-die ﬁnancial contracts are optimal in contracting
situations with risk neutral agents and limited liability. Standard debt contracts emerge
as optimal once additional monotonicity constraints (which can be given good economic
justiﬁcation in the context of many credit markets) are imposed.
14It can be shown that xsswill in general provide the most informative signal whenever
π > π ≥ 1
4.







− E(x|π)+γI ≥ A
g(c)
which is expression (14). In ﬁgure 4 the locus of points above the rising diagonal line
A
g(c) satisfy this relationship.
Comparing the monitoring and collateral characteristics of the joint liability con-
tract to the individual liability loan contracts of the previous section is instructive. A




The cost of the monitoring expense is not added in the group loan as it is to the
minimum collateral requirement of the loan with an outside monitoring intermediary.
The intuition for this result is very simple. Borrowers with an outside monitor need
to commit credibly to making repayments to cover lenders’ opportunity cost of funds
as well as the monitoring expense incurred by an outside monitor. In a group loan,
in contrast, borrowers need only pledge to make outside repayments that cover the
opportunity cost of outsiders’ funds, as the monitoring cost is borne within the group.
The monitoring costs in the group use up resources just as surely as the costs borne
by the outsider, but these monitoring costs can be subtracted out of the borrower’s
enforcement rent without disrupting incentives.
It is worth remarking that the optimal joint liability contract is not just a linear
combination of the contract terms as if separately providing incentives to borrowers
as producers and as monitors. If we had instead used sij = si + wj,w h e r esi is the
borrower’s reward for outcomes on his project and wj is his reward tied to outcomes
on the other borrowers project, and both are deﬁned as under the individual liability
monitored loan contract above15, a degree of joint liability would be achieved, but
not enough. In fact, this contract delivers us back at expression A
d(c) in (12), the
expression for the collateral requirements monitored loan contracts when the dele-
gated monitors were hired staﬀ members who could not post bond. The borrowers in
a group loan are in exactly the same situation: already short on collateral to obtain
a non-monitored loan, they will not have additional collateral to bond themselves as
15In other words sss =
B(c)+c
∆π − A, ssf =
B(c)
∆π − A,sfs = c
∆π − A,sff = −A
18monitors.
The comparison reveals the ‘collateral diversiﬁcation’ eﬀe c ta tw o r k . C o m p a r e d
to the sij = si + wj scheme just described, the optimal contract sharpens incen-
tives in several respects. Incentives to both monitoring and production diligence are
sharpened by piling greater reward on the joint outcome success-success sss, while
incentives to production diligence are increased by penalizing a borrower with a suc-
cessful project outcome when his monitoree’s project fails. Finally, incentives to
monitoring are sharpened by taking away from the reward to monitoring received
when the other borrower’s project success but one’s own production fails.16
Figures 4 about here
A reasonable objection might be raised at this point. Couldn’t an outside monitor
also also take advantage of diversiﬁcation eﬀects? From Diamond (1984) we know that
the delegation costs of using an intermediary monitor fall as the monitor’s portfolio of
monitored borrowers becomes larger and more diverse. It is easy to see, however, that
this does nothing to help reduce the total costs of lending under the individual liability
modality because by construction the delegated monitor-lender earned no enforcement
rent and so delegation costs were already zero. Diversiﬁcation eﬀe c t sw o u l dh e l pl o w e r
the delegation costs of employing hired staﬀ who cannot post bonds, or lower the
amount of capital Im the delegate needs to have at stake in each borrower’s project.
In either case, however, it is the need to repay an outside monitor for his monitoring
expense c which is adding to the cost of operating under individual liability loans.
Summarizing the discussion thus far, peer-monitored loans therefore do oﬀer an
advantage over outside monitored loans, and this advantage does not rest upon a
presumed information advantage held by insiders. Any information or enforcement
advantage that group members may have relative to an outside intermediary will of
course only strengthen the advantage.
The scope for employing group loans will be limited, however, by lenders fear
that borrowers could collude against a lender and will guard against this possibility
by only agreeing to collusion-proof loans.17 Figure 4 shows that group loan contracts
16Compare the shape of the optimal contract described in Proposition 2 to the non-optimal con-
tract described in the previous paragraph and footnote.
17By collusion I refer to the possibility that borrowers might coordinate on a diﬀerent Nash
19will not be oﬀered to any borrower with assets below A(cg), because these borrowers
cannot commit to not colluding together against the lender. As depicted, some poorer
borrowers with assets below this cutoﬀ may still obtain funding from loans monitored
by more expensive moneylenders or intermediaries. As in the scenario described in
the previous section, the poorest of the poor — those below A(c) remain excluded from
the credit market entirely. This result is consistent with many analyses that suggest
that even Grameen Bank is not really lending to the poorest of the poor (Morduch,
1999).
The model predicts that implicit interest charges will be lower on group loans
compared to outside monitored loans for borrowers in the same asset class. Note that
the explicit money interest charges on group loans are always γI for all qualifying
borrowers, although of course the total cost of funds to the borrower must also in-
clude the cost of monitoring others. We again ﬁnd that the implicit interest rate of
borrowing is rising as the borrower’s collateral requirements decrease. However when
joint liability loans are optimal, they will be chosen by borrowers because they oﬀer
a equal or lower total cost of borrowing for any given level of collateral.
3.0.1 Full Side-Contracting and costless monitoring
It is instructive to compare the results of this paper to related discussions such as
Stiglitz (1990) and Laﬀont and Rey (2000) who assume that information in the group
is shared (monitoring costs are nil) and that borrowers can fully side-contract on both
eﬀorts and transfers. Under the assumptions that monitoring is costless and perfectly
reveals diligence eﬀort and that borrowers can fully side contract, the group will
behave as a single supra-individual who acts to maximize joint proﬁts. The relevant
incentive constraint for the group is then:
2(ππsss + π(1 − π)ssf +( 1− π)πsfs+( 1− π)2sff) ≥
2(ππsss + π(1 − π)ssf +( 1− π)πsfs+( 1− π)2sff + B(0))
This expression exploits the symmetry of payoﬀs and states that group members
must prefer to both be diligent rather than both be not diligent. As above a little
equilibrium in the action subgame that is less preferred by the lender. This is diﬀerent from collusion
in the sense of costlessly side-contracting against the lender, as described in the next subsection.
20reﬂection will suggest that to also satisfy limited liability the optimal contract will be
of the form sss = Z −A and sij = −A for all other i,j. Substituting into the lender’s





from both being diligent. By construction this is a higher average payoﬀ than if
neither were diligent. It remains to be checked whether the group prefers both being
diligent to only one borrower being diligent. That this will be the case can be seen




− 2A ≥ 2ππ
B(0)
ππ − ππ
+ B(0) − 2A
2ππB(0) ≥ 2ππB(0) + B(0)(ππ − ππ)
ππ ≥ 2ππ − ππ
π(π − π) ≥ π(π − π)
which is always satisﬁed as π ≥ π.
Full side-contracting cannot always be assumed, however. Borrowers in a group
who agreed to the above contract would be tempted to defect from the equilibrium
unless the group had a strong commitment technology that allowed them to follow
through on promised side transfers. To see this note that defection is worthwhile to








which is always met for π ≥ π. One borrower’s defection raises his personal payoﬀ
at the expense of joint proﬁts. When full side contracting is not possible in this no-
monitoring environment, a group loan contract must satisfy the additional individual
incentive constraints:
ππsss + π(1 − π)ssf +( 1− π)πsfs+( 1− π)2sff ≥
ππsss + π(1 − π)ssf +( 1− π)πsfs+( 1− π)(1 − π)sff + B(0)
which leads us to an optimal contract of the form sss = Z − A and sij = −A for all
21other i,j where Z is given by Z =
B(0)
π∆π a n dap e rb o r r o w e rp a y o ﬀ of π
B(0)
∆π −A. Note
that in this costless monitoring this payoﬀ is exactly the same as what the borrower
would get under an individual liability contract. In other words, the gain to employing
joint liabibility loans in a costless monitoring environment collapses once the ability of
agents to side-contract or ‘collude’ is taken away. When monitoring is costly, however,
an additional gain to joint liability does emerge. Even when borrowers cannot side
contract, a group can economize on incentive costs because the group can absorb
monitoring costs that would have had to have been credibly pledged to an outside
monitor under an individual liability lending arrangement.
3.1 Discussion and Extensions
A joint liability contract in eﬀect forces borrowers to divest themselves in part of their
o w np r o j e c t sa n da c q u i r eas t a k ei na n o t h e rb o rrower’s activity. If the project returns
were perfectly correlated, nothing would be gained, of course, from this transaction.
If project returns are imperfectly correlated, however, each member will be left with
a safer, more diversiﬁed portfolio of projects, and the overall scope for moral hazard
will have been reduced. From the lender’s perspective, each borrower now owns a
less risky portfolio of production and monitoring projects.
Returning to the original model, notice that the scope for making joint liability
loans work depends on the assumed timing of the game in a rather crucial way. As
is standard in most of the literature on monitored lending and hierarchical agency
structures, I have assumed that the monitoring actions that the intermediary or
group members take to modify (other) borrower’s goals are chosen and set in place
prior to the borrower’s choice of diligence. Any threatened or implied sanctions that
might form part of this monitoring strategy are hence assumed to be in place and
credibly believed by the borrower to whom they are directed. The possibilities for
peer-monitoring unravel under the alternative assumption that both monitoring and
productive action strategies are chosen simultaneously:
Remark 2 If the structure of the game is modiﬁed so that borrower-cum-monitors
choose their monitoring and productive activity actions simultaneously rather than
sequentially, then the scope for creating social collateral through peer-monitoring col-
lapses.
This result is helpful for understanding the strong negative result obtained by
22Itoh (1991) that teamwork will only be optimal under the assumption that “the mar-
ginal disutility of monitoring eﬀort is zero at zero monitoring.” That group lending
collapses when the game is simultaneous can be demonstrated by contradiction. For
assume otherwise. Then a group contract does exist which implements the symmet-
ric action pair. Since this is the assumed Nash equilibrium outcome, (π,c) must be a
symmetric best response. But this cannot in fact be the case because borrower 1 will
reason that his best response to (π,c) is in fact (π,0): given that borrower two will
choose diligence, borrower one can only gain by economizing on the costly monitor-
ing activity c. Borrower two will then reason that his best response to borrower 1’s
(π,0) is (π,0), which in turn leads borrower one to change to (π,0).T h u st h eo n l y
symmetric equilibrium action-monitoring strategy of the game is (π,0).
This paper therefore shows a way out of Itoh’s dilemma. This points to an im-
portant aspect of the design of group contracts. It is not enough simply to create a
joint liability contract to induce peer monitoring; the contract must also rely on a
particular timing sequence and requires commitment. Actual lending practices may
be reﬂecting these facts. The scheduling of regular group meetings, the use of peri-
odic interim evaluations and monitoring reports, contingent loan renewals over time
and the practice of rotating loans amongst borrowers so that not all have a loan at
the same time, etc., are all mechanisms that may help to make monitoring strategies
credible and may also be aimed at reducing the possibility of collusion. This is an
area that merits further investigation.
There are many directions that this analysis can be extended. Allowing the bor-
rowers to operate variable investment scale projects, to choose continuous action
choice sets or to operate production technologies with multiple project outcomes
should not alter the main ﬁndings in a fundamental way; nor should making borrow-
ers risk averse18.
The problem would be complicated in more interesting ways by introducing a
more general correlation structure in the production project returns across borrow-
ers. Several complementary and oﬀsetting forces would then likely come into play to
determine the shape of the ﬁnal optimal contract. On the one hand, one might want
18In work that was carried out independently of my earlier 1996 paper on group loans, Madajewicz
(1997) studied a model similar to the one of this paper and extends some results to the case of risk
averse agents, under somewhat restrictive assumptions about risk preferences.
23the contract to encourage monitoring interaction among the members through joint
liability contracts for the reasons analyzed here. The contract would make each bor-
rower’s reward an increasing function of the measured performance of other borrowers
in the group. If, however, there is suﬃcient correlation in the production project out-
comes across borrowers, then one might want the contract to work in the opposite
direction. For the reasons identiﬁed in the relative performance evaluation (RPE)
literature, one might want to make each borrower’s reward a decreasing function of
the other borrower’s measured performance.
While these two eﬀects will therefore typically be in conﬂict, in a somewhat more
general setting a lender might be able to design a structure that involves elements
of both types of contract. For example, the lender might group borrowers into
small borrowing circles within which joint liability incentives are used to encour-
a g ep e e r - m o n i t o r i n g ,w h i l ea tt h es a m et i m eu s i n gr e l a t i v ep e r f o r m a n c ee v a l u a t i o n
across groups.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Much of the legal institutional infrastruc t u r et h a ti st a k e nf o rg r a n t e di nm o r ea f -
ﬂuent and developed areas of the world that helps to frame and enforce economic
transactions is often either imperfectly established or entirely missing in poorer ar-
eas, developing countries, and economies in transition. In such circumstances, lenders
will ﬁnd it simply unproﬁtable to lend to small and poor borrowers without additional
collateral guarantees, even when they are free to charge whatever interest rate they
want to recover expenses. If the poor are to have a chance to build upon their ener-
gies and abilities rather than remain marginalized because of the misfortune of having
too few liquid resources, then eﬀective intermediary institutions and contract arrange-
m e n t st ob u i l db r i d g e sb e t w e e nt h ep o o ra n dn e wc r e d i ta n dt r a d eo p p o r t u n i t i e sw i l l
be needed.
Joint liability lending appears to be one such innovative mechanism, not only
because it builds upon existing information and enforcement methods in local com-
munities but more fundamentally because it may potentially stimulate new moni-
toring and enforcement activities. While other analyses of group loans under moral
h a z a r dh a v er e l i e du p o na na s s u m e di n f o r m a t i o na d v a n t a g eo rf u l ls i d e - c o n t r a c t i n g
24assumptions and costless monitoring, this paper has shown that an advantage to joint
liability loans exists even under the more realistic assumption that borrowers cannot
side-contract and monitoring is costly and subject to moral hazard. While group
loans were shown to be sometimes optimal, the limits to group lending were also
made apparent, and diﬀerent types of ﬁnancial contracts will be optimal for diﬀerent
types of borrowers.
Are joint liability contracts nothing more than a curious and specialized contract
form that has proven useful only to a few microﬁnance organizations worldwide, and
interesting primarily to economic theorists? This is a debate that ultimately needs
to be settled empirically, using methods that test the theory. A case can be made
that joint liability contracts are in fact ubiquitous in our society: a large part of all
economic activity takes place within households, ﬁrms, partnerships, work teams,
and other sorts of group which are organized at least in part by property relations
that imply some form of proﬁt sharing or joint liability (Holmstrom, 1999). Rather
than just being narrowly compensated for their individually measured performance
or contribution to a project, members share in the fortunes and misfortunes of the
overall enterprise. There is much room for further research on these topics.
25Appendix1.
To show that the proposed contract sij is optimal requires that we show that it
induces a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) where each borrower
chooses the strategy proﬁle (c,π) and monitoring expense c is kept at a minimum.To
do this we ﬁrst characterize equilibria to the subgames ζ(·,·) and then argue why the
contract induces each player to choose minimum monitoring intensity c in the ﬁrst
stage.
Figure 5 helps visualize the payoﬀst od i ﬀerent cells in the subgames ζ(·,·) dis-
cussed below. The ﬁgure is drawn for borrower 1 monitoring at intensity c. Borrower
1’s payoﬀ i st h e nd r a w no nt h ev e r t i c a la n db o r r o wer two’s monitoring intensity is on
the horizontal. Note that the structure of the optimal contract discussed in Propo-
sition 1 requires DD(c,c) ≥ NN(0,0) ≥ NN(c,0) where the ﬁrst inequality follows
from the no-collusion constraint (17) and the second inequality is obvious. Since
DD(c,c)=DD(c,0), it follows that DD(c,0) ≥ NN(c,0).T h eﬁgure is drawn for
t h ec a s ew h e r et h i sh o l d sa sas t r i c te q u a l i t y( p o i n tC).
Lemma 3 : Under the proposed optimal contract DD(c,c)−ND(c,c) >D N(c,c)−
NN(c,c).
Proof: Assume not. Then DD(c,c) − ND(c,c) ≤ DN(c,c) − NN(c,c). Sub-
stituting the optimal contract of the form sss = Z(c) and sij = −A(c) for all other
i,j and rearranging leads to the conclusion that πZ(c) ≤ πZ(c), a contradiction since
by assumption π > π.
The fact that DD(c,c)−ND(c,c) >D N(c,c)−NN(c,c) suggests that the player’s
actions in the subgame ζ(c,c) are strategic complements: player 1’s marginal payoﬀ
to choosing diligence over non-diligence is increasing in player two’s level of diligence,
and vice-versa. The presence of strategic complementarities alerts us to the possibility
of multiple, pareto ranked equilibria in this subgame (Cooper and John, 1988). As
the following claim establishes, this is indeed the case.
Lemma 4 : (π,π) and (π,π) are Pareto ranked Nash equilibria of subgame ζ(c,c),
with DD(c,c) >NN(c,c).
26Proof: (π,π) is a Nash equilibrium by construction since DD(c,c) ≥ ND(c,c)
(recall 16). To see that (π,π) is also a Nash equilibrium requires that NN(c,c) ≥
DN(c,c).From the previous lemma the vertical distance DD(c,c)−DN(c,c) is larger
than the vertical distance ND(c,c) −NN(c,c) (segment EG is larger than segment
ED in the ﬁgure). Thus NN(c,c0) will intersect DN(c,c0) at some point c∗∗ >c .
This is indicated by point F in the ﬁgure. Thus NN(c,c) >D N (c,c),a n dπ is a
best response to π and vice-versa.
That the equilibria are pareto ranked follows from the fact that DD(c,c) ≥
NN(0,0) >N N (c,0) ≥ NN(c,c) where the ﬁrst inequality follows from the no-
collusion constraint, the second one is obvious because monitoring is a cost, and the
last inequality follows because B(0) ≥ B(c0) for all c0 ≥ 0. I assume that the borrowers
coordinate on the higher equilibrium.
Lemma 5 : (π,π) is the unique Nash equilibrium to subgames ζ(0,c), ζ(c,0) and
ζ(0,0).
Proof: Consider subgame ζ(0,c). From the ﬁgure it is evident that (π,π) cannot
be a Nash equilibrium because ND(c,0) ≥ DD(c,0) so borrower one’s best reaction
to π is π. However, borrower one chooses π as a best response to two’s π because
NN(0,c) >D N(0,c). Since borrower two would do likewise (π,π) i st h eu n i q u eN a s h
equilibrium of the subgame. A symmetric line of reasoning establishes the result for
ζ(0,c) and ζ(0,0).
Moving back in the game tree, since the equilibrium payoﬀ DD(c,c) to borrower
one from subgame ζ(c,c) is higher than the equilibrium payoﬀ NN(0,c)from subgame
ζ(0,c) it is evident that c is a best response to c at the ﬁr s ts t a g e .I ti sj u s ta se a s yt o
see that (0,0) is also a Nash equilibrium of the game in monitoring intensities. The
no-collusion constraint (17) requires, however, that payoﬀst oe a c hb o r r o w e ru n d e r
(c,c) exceed those from (0,0) to assume the two borrowers will not collude to choose
the former equilibrium. Thus {(c,π),(c,π)} emerges as the chosen subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium of the overall game.19
To see that the proposed solution minimizes on monitoring costs, note that the
borrower’s overall return E(si|π,π)=E(x|π)+γI − c will be maximized when
19It is straightforward to show that the ﬁrst-stage game in monitoring intensities also displays
strategic complementarities, or that DD(c,c) − NN(0,c) >NN(c,0) − NN(0,0).
27monitoring intensity is at a minimum. The minimum monitoring intensity is obtained
when the borrower uses all of his available collateral resources, at A = Ag(c), which
is the value used in the proposed optimal contract.
A last step is to check whether there are in fact any gains to monitoring within
a group, in other words, whether the ﬁrst dollar spent on monitoring reduces the
collateral requirement or whether
dAg(c)
dc |c=0 < 0. This condition simpliﬁes to Bc(0) <
−1
π, the condition stated at the outset of Proposition.
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First Stage Game 
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